Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Kenneth Riddle v. Alan Mays and Mountain States
Insulation Corp. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nelson K. Hayes; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Defendants.
Gordon K. Jensen; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Riddle v. Mays and Mountain States Insulation Corp., No. 880204.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2156

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTM*

SUPREM£

COURT

UTAH
T
0 OCUMEN
tf>.9

ft****
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH RIDDLE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 880204
vs.
Category 14(b)
ALAN MAYS and MOUNTAIN
STATES INSULATION CORP., a
Utah corporation,
Defendants/Respondents
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE J. PHILLIP EVES PRESIDING
GORDON K. JENSEN
ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
NELSON L. HAYES
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH RIDDLE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 880204
vs.
Category 14(b)
ALAN MAYS and MOUNTAIN
STATES INSULATION CORP., a
Utah corporation,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE J. PHILLIP EVES PRESIDING
GORDON K. JENSEN
ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
NELSON L. HAYES
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.
Nature of the Case
,
B.
Course of Proceedings
C.
Statement of Relevant Facts...,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

3
3
4

ARGUMENT:
I.

THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, BARRED BY THE
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-60
A.

The Language and Legislative
History of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-62 and the Shupe
Decision of This Court
Allow the Plaintiff's Claim
to Proceed
,

B.

Assuming That the Issue of
Owens-Corning's Control Over
MSI is Relevant to the Determination of This Appeal,
Genuine Issues of Fact Exist
Which Require Remand for
Further Proceedings

CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ADDENDUM

21
24
26
27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page No.
Cases:
Adamson v. Okland Construction Company,
29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973)

13,15

Bennett v. Industrial Commission,
726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986)

9,23

Gallegos v. Stringham,
21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968)

13,15

Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc.,
577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978)

Jacobson v. Industrial Commission,
738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct.App. 1987)
Moloso v. State,
644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982)
Peterson v. Fowler,
27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972)
Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby,
678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984)
Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co.,
546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976)

16,17,18,
19,20,21,
24
9
22
13,15
9,23

7,10,15,
16,24

Smith v. Alfred Brown Co.,
27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972)
W.W. and W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann,
680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984)
iii

13,15
23

Other Authorities:
Utah Code Ann.;
S35-l-42(3)(b) (1987)

2,6,7,8,
9,10,12,
13,14,18,
20

§35-1-60 (1987)

1,2,4,6,
8,12,16,
20,21,22

§35-1-62 (1987)

2,6,7,8,
11,12,13,
14,15,16,
18,19,20,
21,24

§78-2-2(3) ( j) (1988)

1

Rules of the Utah Supreme Court;
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

3(a)
24(a)
24(a)(6)
24(f)

1
1
2
4

iv

The plaintiff/appellant, Kenneth Riddle, pursuant to
Rule 24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, submits the
following Brief.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(1988) and Rule 3(a) of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

This is an appeal from a

final Order and Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court
in

and

for

Iron

County,

Phillip Eves presiding.

State

of Utah, the Honorable

J.

The Order and Judgment entered by the

trial court granted the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied the plaintiff's

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's complaint was barred by the exclusive remedy provision
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1987).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are presented to this Court for
review:
1.

Did the district court err in concluding, as a

matter of law, that Ken Riddle, an employee of Owens-Corning,
may

not pursue a claim

for personal

injuries

against Alan

Mays, an employee of a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, such
claim being barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-60?
2.

Did the trial court err by failing to conclude,

as a matter of law, that Ken Riddle, an employee of OwensCorning, may pursue a claim for personal injuries against Alan
Mays, an employee of a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, such
claim not being barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Court's interpretation of the following statutes
is determinative of the issues presented for review.

Pursuant

to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, these
statutes are set our verbatim in Appendix A of the Addendum to
this Brief.
1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42(3)(b) (1987);

2.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1987);

3.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1987).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A,

Nature of the Case.
This is a negligence action brought by the plaintiff

against the defendants for injuries sustained by the plaintiff
in a truck wreck on January 2, 1985 at the Intermountain Power
Project ("IPP").

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff

was sitting in a parked truck which was hit by a truck driven
by the defendant Alan Mays.

Both men were on the job, within

the scope of their employment, when the accident happened.

The

plaintiff was employed by Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation
("Owens-Corning"),

an

insulation

subcontractor

at

IPP

install insulation and paneling and to erect a warehouse.

to
The

defendant Mays was employed by Mountain States Insulation Corp.
("MSI"), a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, providing labor to
erect the warehouse.
and

general

damages

The plaintiff's Complaint seeks special
from

the

defendants

based

upon

the

negligence of the defendant Mays, acting within the scope and
course of his employment with the defendant MSI.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
After the plaintiff's Complaint was filed and some

discovery conducted, the defendants moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that the plaintiff's Complaint was barred by the
3

exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60.

The

plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment that, as a
matter of law, his Complaint was not barred by that exclusive
remedy provision.
After

reviewing

the

memoranda

submitted

by

the

parties and hearing oral argument, the Honorable J. Phillip
Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State
of Utah, granted the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied the plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
These rulings are set forth in Orders dated, respectively, May
4, 1988 and June 15, 1988.
The transcript

of

the April

19, 1988 hearing

at

which Judge Eves issued his decision is attached as Appendix B
of the Addendum to this Brief pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts.
The issues to be decided by this Court are based on

facts essentially not in dispute.
1.

Those facts are:

Bechtel was the general contractor at IPP.

(R.

p. 322; Appendix C, page 1.)
2.
IPP

to

Owens-Corning was an insulation subcontractor at

install

insulation

and

4

paneling

and

to

erect

a

warehouse-

(R. pp. 322 and 371(3); Riddle Deposition, pages 11

and 15; Reporter's Transcript, Appendix B, p. 3.)
3.

The plaintiff, Kenneth Riddle

employed by Owens-Corning.

("Riddle"), was

(R. pp. 310, 32 3 and 371(3); Riddle

Deposition, pp 10 and 15; Reporter's Transcript, Appendix B, p.
3.)
4.

Owens-Corning subcontracted with Mountain States

Insulation

("MSI")

for MSI to provide

labor

to erect the

warehouse.

(R. pp. 310, 323 and 371(6); Riddle Deposition, p.

18; Recorder's Transcript, Appendix B, p. 6; Appendix D, p. 2.)
5.

The defendant Alan Mays ("Mays") was an employee

of the defendant MSI.

(R. pp. 1, 310, 323 and 371(6); Riddle

Deposition, pp. 19 and 94; Reporter's Transcript, Appendix B,
p. 6; Appendix D, p. 2.)
6.

The plaintiff was injured at IPP when the parked

truck he was sitting in was hit by a truck driven by the
defendant Alan Mays.
7.

(R. pp. 1-4 and 323.)

Both Riddle and Mays were on the job, within the

scope of their employment, when the accident happened.

(R. pp

1, 310, 32 3; Appendix C, p. 2; Appendix D, p. 2.)
Additional
determination

of this

facts

material

to

this

Court's

appeal

are found

in the defendants'

Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and
5

the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment and in Support of his Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Those memoranda are attached as Appendix C

and Appendix D of the Addendum to this Brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in
concluding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's Complaint
was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-60.

The plaintiff's arguments are based on the language

and history of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (3) (b) ("Section 42"),
defining those liable for worker's compensation benefits and
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 ("Section 62"), defining those parties
against whom an injured worker may pursue tort claims.

The

plaintiff's arguments are also based on the decisions of this
Court construing those statutes, with particular attention to
the effect of the 1975 Legislative amendments to Section 62.
Before the 1975 amendments to Section 62, this Court
had been applying the Section 42 expanded definition of "statutory employer" to determine those immune from tort liability
under

Section

insulate

from

62.
tort

The effect

of those

decisions

was to

liability

virtually

everyone

on

6

the

jobsite.

The

clarified

that

1975
the

Legislative
definition

amendments
of

to

"statutory

Section

62

employer"

in

Section 42 was not to be used in determining who is or is not
subject to tort liability under Section 62.
The

1975

amendments

to

Section

62

preserved

an

injured worker's tort claim against anyone on the jobsite not
the actual employer of the injured worker.

The plaintiff's

actual employer is Owens-Corning.

The plaintiff is allowed to

pursue

defendants,

his

claim

against

the

subcontractor of Owens-Corning.

as

MSI

is

a

This issue was addressed by

this Court in Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah
1976).
an

The Shupe decision controls this appeal by holding that

injured

worker

may

pursue

tort

claims

against

a

subcontractor of his actual employer.
ARGUMENT
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS ARE NOTr AS A MATTER OF LAW,
BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-60
A.

The Language and Legislative History of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-62 and the Shupe Decision of This Court Allow the
Plaintiff's Claim to Proceed.
The determination of the issues on appeal in this

case requires understanding the purposes of and relationship
between Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (3) (b) ("Section 42") and Utah
7

Code

Ann. §35-1-62

("Section

62") as

they

relate

to the

exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 ("Section
60").

Section

Section

42

42 and Section

defines

those

62 have distinct purposes.

liable

for worker's

compensation

benefits and reads as follows:
Where any employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and this work is a
part or process in the trade or business of
the employer, the contractor, all persons
employed by him, all subcontractors under
himf and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractors, are considered
employees of the original employer.
Section

62 defines

those

parties

against whom an

injured worker may pursue tort claims and reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
When any injury or death for which
compensation is payable under this title
shall have been caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of a person other than an
employer, officer, agent, or employee of
said employer, the injured employee, or in
case of death, his dependents, may claim
compensation and the injured employee or
his heirs or personal representatives may
also have an action for damages against
such third person. . . .
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representatives may also
maintain an action for damages against
subcontractors, general contractors,
independent contractors, property owners or
8

their lessees or assigns, not occupying an
employee-employer relationship with the
injured or deceased employee at the time of
his injury or death.
Section 42 represents a class of statutes known as
"statutory employer" statutes.

The statutes are designed to

allow injured workers to reach beyond irresponsible, uninsured
actual employers to receive worker's compensation benefits if
they

are

injured

on the

job.

These

"statutory

employer"

statutes impose ultimate liability for benefits on contractors
exercising the requisite supervision and control over the work
of the injured worker.

Jacobson v. Industrial Commission, 738

P.2d 658 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).

The entire "statutory employer"

scheme demonstrates a desire on the part of the Legislature to
extend

the

protection

and

scope

of

worker's

compensation

benefits to those who might not be deemed employees under the
common law.
(Utah

Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305

1984).

statutes

Because

the purpose

of

is to broaden those parties

"statutory

employer"

from whom an injured

worker may seek compensation benefits, this Court has stated
that

Section

protecting
receives

42

the
the

should
injured

appropriate

be

construed

worker

to

benefits.

Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).

9

broadly

ensure

in

that

Bennett

v.

favor of

he

or

she

Industrial

Section
those

liable

42, therefore, expands

for worker's

compensation

worker's actual employer*
provides

assurance

that

The

the

definition

of

benefits beyond the

"statutory employer" concept

benefits

will

be

available

to an

injured worker if his actual employer proves irresponsible and
doesn't have worker's compensation
general contractors
project are insured.

to make

insurance.

It pressures

sure the subcontractors on the

The concept is salutary as it increases

the possibilities that any worker injured on a construction
project

will

be

able

to

tap

into

worker's

compensation

benefits.
Section

42 does

not

address

tort

liability.

As

stated by Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion in Shupe v.
Wasatch Electric Company, Inc., 546 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1976):
The Legislature in enacting Section 35-1-42
was not concerned with third-party tort
liability; its purpose was to establish a
general
statutory
definition of an
employer, to assure that a general
contractor would guarantee compensation for
the employees of a subcontractor.
Section 62, on the other hand, allows tort claims by
injured

workers

against

third

parties

not

in

an

actual

employer-employee relationship with the injured worker.

The

language of Section 62, defining the parties against whom a

10

tort claim may be pursued, has changed over the years to effect
the intent of the Legislature.
Before 1939, Section 62 allowed an injured worker to
pursue tort claims against a negligent

"third person."

In

1939, the "third person" language was changed to allow tort
claims against "another person not in the same employment" as
the injured employee.

This 19 39 change in the language of

Section 62 was designed to protect the injured worker's actual
employer and co-employees from tort claims because the actual
employer

was

liable

to

the

injured

worker

for

worker's

compensation benefits.
After the 1939 amendments to Section 62, allowing
tort claims against "another person not in the same employment"
as the injured employee, something unforeseen and unintended by
the Legislature happened.

To determine who was "in the same

employment" as the injured worker under Section 62 and thus
immune from tort liability under Section 60, this Court began
applying the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42.

In

other words, this Court applied the expansive definition of
employer found in Section 42, used to define those liable for
worker's compensation benefits, to determine who was in the
same employment as the injured worker and immune from tort
liability under Section 62.
11

The

practical

effect

of

these

decisions

was

insulate from tort liability everybody on the jobsite.

to

As a

practical matter under Section 42, everyone on a project had a
common

statutory

employer,

usually

the

general

contractor.

Therefore, all were "statutory co-employees" deemed to be "in
the same employment" under Section 62 and unable to pursue tort
claims.

The exclusive

remedy provision of Section

60 was

applied to bar tort claims whether the injured worker was suing
a contractor "upstream" or "downstream."
For
contractors
statutory

the
are

purposes
those

employers

of

of

this

Brief,

contractors

who

an

worker

injured

would

"upstream"
qualify

because

of

as
the

supervision and control exercised over the work of the injured
worker's actual employer.

"Downstream" contractors are other

contractors on the project who do not exercise supervision or
control over the injured worker's actual employer and who,
consequently, could not be responsible for the injured worker's
worker's compensation benefits.
Examples of the Utah Supreme Court decisions barring
tort claims of injured workers against those not their actual
employers, by

applying

language, include;
P.2d

31

the

Section

42

"statutory employer"

Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442

(1968)(tort claim of employee of general contactor
12

against excavation subcontractor barred; Smith v. Alfred Brown
Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972)(tort claim of employee
of masonry subcontractor against general contractor barred);
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972) (claim
of employee of general contractor against ceiling tile subcontractor barred); Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29
Utah 2d 286, 508 P. 2d 805 (1973) (tort claim of employee of
electrical subcontractor against general contractor barred).
In 1975, the Utah Legislature amended Section 62 to
clarify

those

subject

to

third-party

tort

liability.

The

Legislature was aware of the decisions of this Court applying
the Section 42 employer definition to the "same employment"
language

of

Section

interpretation

had

62

and

created

the
on

generalized
the

jobsite.

immunity
The

that
"same

employment" language of Section 62 was, therefore, amended to
read that a tort claim could be maintained by an injured worker
against "a person other than an employer, officer, agent, or
employee of said employer."

The Legislature also added the

following significant language to Section 62:
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also
maintain an action for damages against
subcontractors, general contractors,
independent contractors, property owners or
their lessees or assigns, not occupying an
13

employee-employer relationship with the
injured or deceased employee at the time of
his injury or death, (Emphasis added.)
The language and legislative

intent of these 1975

amendments are clear.

The expansive definition of "statutory

employer"

42, used

in

Section

to

determine

liability

for

compensation benefits, is not to be used in determining who is
or is not subject to tort liability under Section 62.

The

judicially-created interplay between Section 42 and Section 62
was

expressly

worker's

tort

eliminated

by

claim

preserved

was

the Legislature.
against

The

all

injured

those

"not

occupying an employer-employee relationship" with the injured
employee.
The

plaintiff

contends

that, this

1975

amendment

allows an injured worker to pursue tort claims against anyone
on the jobsite other than his actual employer.

This would

include "upstream" contractors who may qualify as the injured
worker's

"statutory

contractors

exercising

employer,"
no

as

supervision

well
or

as

"downstream"

control

over

the

injured worker.
The decisions of this Court interpreting

the 19 7 5

amendments to Section 6 2 have created some confusion as to the
parties on

the

jobsite against whom

pursue tort claims.
14

an injured worker may

The first opportunity for this Court to address the
1975 amendments to Section 62 came in Shupe v. Wasatch Electric
Co. , 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976).

In that case, the heirs of the

deceased employee of a general contractor brought a wrongful
death action against an electrical subcontractor.
causing

the

before the

general

contractor's

1975 amendments

employee's

The accident

death

happened

to Section 62 became effective.

Applying the pre-1975 "same employment" language and following
the

judicial

precedent

of

Adamsonf

Smith,

Peterson

and

Gallegos, the trial court found that the general contractor's
employee and the subcontractor were "in the same employment"
and granted

summary

judgment

in favor of the subcontractor

based on the exclusive remedy provision of Section 60.

On

appeal, this Court addressed the effect of the 1975 amendments
to Section 62.
Justice

Tucker,

noting

that

the

Legislature

was

"undoubtedly aware of the decisions of this court construing
the terms 'same employment'," stated that, "the amendment, if
applicable, would leave the plaintiffs in court."

Ri. at 898.

The summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor, like that
granted in this case, would, therefore, have been reversed if
the 1975 amendments to Section 62 had applied.

The Court held,

however, that the amendments had no retroactive application,
15

that

the

pre-1975

"same

employment"

language

applied

and,

therefore, affirmed the trial court.
The plaintiff here contends that the Shupe decision
controls this appeal.

The 1975 amendment language does apply

to this case and, under Shupe, an injured worker may pursue a
claim

against

subcontractor
employer.

a subcontractor
of

Under

of his employer.

Owens-Corning,

the

Shupe, the exclusive

MSI

plaintiff's
remedy

is a
actual

provision of

Section 60 does not bar the plaintiff's claim.

Ken Riddle

may, as a matter of law, pursue his claim against MSI and Mays.
In 1978, this Court decided Hinds v. Herm Hughes &
Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978).

The Hinds decision does

not control this appeal, but needs to be addressed because it
was raised in the trial court and because of the confusion it
has created regarding third-party tort claims.
The relationship of the parties in Hinds is similar
to

the

relationship

of

the

parties

to this

appeal.

The

difference in the two cases is the position, in the contractor
hierarchy, occupied

by the injured worker.

Bechtel was the general contractor at IPP.

In this case,

Owens-Corning, the

plaintiff's actual employer, was an insulation subcontractor

16

who subcontracted with MSI, Mays's actual employer, for labor.
The schematic of that relationship is as follows:

BECHTEL
*

—

OWENS-CORNING (PLAINTIFF)

t
MSI (DEFENDANT)

In Hinds, Sprout Waldron & Company was the general
contractor.

Herm

Hughes

&

Sons

subcontractor

to

contractor.

Hughes

construct

a

warehouse

("Hayes") to construct

contracted

with

("Hughes")
for

Mark

the masonry walls

was

the

the

general

Hayes

Masonry

in the warehouse.

Hinds, an employee of Hayes, filed a tort claim when he was
injured by the alleged negligence of an employee of Hughes.
The case on appeal would be the same as Hinds if Alan
Mays, an employee of MSI, were pursuing a claim against the
plaintiff, an employee of Owens-Corning.
17

That's not the case

here-

The Hinds decision should be limited to its facts and

does not control this appeal.
The plaintiff contends that the 1975 amendments to
Section 62 allow tort claims against anyone on the jobsite not
the actual employer of the injured worker.
claims

against

a party

qualifying

as

This would include

the

"statutory employer" under Section 42.

injured

worker's

This Court in Hinds,

however, held that when considering "upstream" tort claims, the
"statutory employer" definition of Section 42 is relevant in
determining who is an employer and immune from tort liability
under Section 62.

By again injecting the Section 42 definition

of "statutory employer" into the determination of those immune
from tort claims under Section 62, the Court disregarded the
language and intent of the Legislature in enacting the 1975
amendment to Section 62.

Regarding "upstream" tort claims, the

Hinds decision throws the law back to its pre-1975 status.
Hinds
interpretation
expressed
Hinds.

by

was
of

the

improperly
1975

Justice Wilkins

decided.

amendments
in his

to

The
Section

dissenting

62

is

opinion

in

He states:
The 1975 amendment of "employer, officer,
agent or employee of such employer" was
inserted to define those persons who then
and thenceforward would be immune from
third-party
civil
action and is a
manifestation of legislative intent to
18

proper

eliminate from immunity those persons who
fell under the umbrella of statutory
employer prior to the amendment. And, as
further evidence of this intent, the
Legislature added the paragraph which
begins with "For purposes of this section
and notwithstanding the provisions of
section 35-1-42. . . . "
Because of these amendments, the only
persons who now enjoy immunity from civil
action should be the direct and actual
employer (and, of course, his officers,
agents and employees) of the injured
workman.
Id. at 566.
This Court should overrule the Hinds decision and
hold that third-party tort claims may proceed against anyone
not the actual employer of the injured worker, even those
qualifying as the injured worker's statutory employer.

Such

action is not, however, required to reverse the trial court's
granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this
case.
The Hinds case involved an "upstream" claim against a
party who may have qualified as the injured worker's "statutory
employer."

That is not the case on appeal here.

MSI exercised

no supervision or control over the plaintiff and, as such,
could not qualify as the plaintiff's "statutory employer."

MSI

could

for

not, therefore, be

responsible

19

to

the plaintiff

worker's compensation benefits and should not benefit from the
exclusive remedy provision of Section 60.
To affirm the trial court in this case would render
the 1975 amendment to Section 62 meaningless.
Hinds,

the

1975

amendment

"enables

an

As stated in

employee

to

sue a

tortfeasor, not his employer (or the employer's agent, etc.),
even

though

the

injured

person

engaged in the same employment."

and

the

tortfeasor

^d.. at 562.

may be

MSI argues that

it is immune from tort liability because the plaintiff and
Mays, an employee of MSI, are statutory co-employees under
Section 42.

Under the expansive language of Section 42, all

workers on the jobsite are statutory employees of the general
contractor.
jobsite

Under

would

be

those

immune

circumstances,
from

tort

everyone

liability.

on
The

the
1975

amendments to Section 62, specifically allowing tort claims
against

non-employers, would

amendments

be meaningless.

If the

1975

are to have any purpose, the plaintiff must be

allowed to pursue his claim against MSI, a subcontractor of the
plaintiff's actual employer.
Barring the plaintiff's claim does not comport with
the policies

underlying

employer

granted

subject

is
to

providing

the Workers' Compensation Act.

immunity

from

worker's
20

suit

because,

compensation

in

benefits,

An
being
the

employer assures qualifying workers a recovery.

Subcontractors

like MSI, with no supervision or control over the plaintiff,
have no liability for compensation benefits to the plaintiff
and, therefore, no policy for extending immunity exists.

The

defendants should not be allowed to benefit from the exclusive
remedy provision of Section 60.

If such benefit is allowed,

the defendants have neither the potential obligation to pay
worker's compensation benefits to the plaintiff, nor do they
have any exposure to the plaintiff for tort liability.

That

type of protection was never contemplated by the Legislature
and should not be upheld by this Court.
B.

Assuming That the Issue of Owens-Corningfs Control Over
MSI is Relevant to the Determination of This Appeal,
Genuine Issues of Fact Exist Which Reguire Remand for
Further Proceedings.
MSI's Motion

for Summary

Judgment

focused on the

supervision and control exercised by Owens-Corning over MSI.
The plaintiff argues that, for the purposes of this appeal, the
control, if any, exercised by Owens-Corning over MSI is irrelevant.

MSI, as a "downstream" subcontractor exercising no

control over the plaintiff, is not entitled to the exclusive
remedy defense.

MSI can escape tort liability in this case

only by showing that it was the actual employer or, under
Hinds, the statutory employer (although the plaintiff disagrees
with the Hinds majority), of Riddle.
21

Clearly, MSI was not the

actual employer of Riddle.

Owens-Corning was.

the

of

"statutory

employer"

the

plaintiff

Whether MSI was
depends

on

the

supervision and control MSI exercised over Riddle, not vice
versa.

As a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, MSI had no right

of control over Riddle.

MSI cannot qualify as the plaintiff's

statutory

cannot, therefore, benefit

employer

and

from the

exclusive remedy provision of Section 60.
If this Court determines that the issue of OwensCorning 's control over MSI is somehow relevant in deciding the
issues on appeal, genuine issues of fact were presented to the
trial court regarding that control which require the reversal
of the trial court ruling and the remand of this case for
further proceedings.
The question of control is a question of fact for the
jury.

Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982).

It is the

right to control rather than the actual exercise of control
that determines the relationship between the parties.
supra, at 309.

The right to control is usually found in the

language of a written contract between the parties.
written

contract

Pinter,

exists

between

Owens-Corning

No such

and MSI and,

therefore, the right to control must be determined by other
factors.

22

Many factors have been applied in determining the
right to control.

Among those factors are actual supervision

of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method of
payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker, and the
right

to

terminate

the

worker.

Bennett

v.

Industrial

Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
Ken Riddle testified at his deposition that:

(1) he

did not supervise the work of Alan Mays (p. 19); (2) Maynard
Crossland, a part owner of MSI, supervised and instructed Mays
(p. 19); (3) Riddle had no authority to fire Mays without the
approval of Maynard Crossland (p.94); and (4) MSI, not OwensCorning, paid Mays from MSI's payroll (p.95).

It only takes

one sworn statement under oath to dispose of the averments on
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact.
W.W. and W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah
1984).

The sworn deposition testimony of the plaintiff is

sufficient to create issues of fact regarding Owens-Corning's
right

to control MSI

and

summary

inappropriate.
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judgment was, therefore,

CONCLUSION

The language and intent of the 1975 amendments to
Section 62 allow the plaintiff to pursue his claim against the
defendants as a matter of law.
Court's decision in Shupe.

That result is governed by this

While the plaintiff asserts that

Hinds was wrongly decided and should be overruled, Hinds does
not

govern

this

appeal.

MSI

could

not

qualify

as

the

plaintiff's "statutory employer" and, regardless of the Hinds
decision, the plaintiff's claim against MSI is specifically
allowed under Shupe and the language of Section 62.

This Court

should reverse the trial court ruling granting the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the plaintiff's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment,

and remand this case for trial on

the plaintiff's negligence claim against the defendants.
Owens-Corning's
this appeal.

be

control

to

to

however,

over MSI

presented

and the plaintiff, which was none, that

relevant

determines,

is irrelevant to

Under Hinds, it is MSI's supervision and control

over Owens-Corning
would

control over MSI

the

MSI's

that

immunity.

Owens-Corning's

is relevant, genuine
trial

court
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If

Court

supervision

issues of

requiring

this

and

fact were

reversal

of

the

g r a n t i n g of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s

Motion for Summary Judgment and

roceedings.
remand for f u r t h e r proceedings
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APPENDIX A

DIX A - l

l-fl. Employers enumerated and defined •
RrguUrly employed - Independent contractors.
The following constitute employers subject to the
ovisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and
:hool district in the state,
(2)(a) Every person, firm, and corporation, inciting every public utility, having in service one or
ore workmen or operatives regularly employed in
c same business, or in or about the same cstabli>ment, under any contract of hire, express or
ipiied, oral or written, except:
(i) agricultural employers: (A) whose employes arc all members of the immediate family of the
nployer, which employer has a proprietary interest
the farm, the inclusion of any immediate family
ember under the provisions of this title being at
ie option of the employer; or (B) who employ five
fewer persons other than immediate family
embers for 40 hours or more per week per empir e for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the
•eceding 12 months; and
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ
nc employee or more than one employee at least 40
Durs per week.
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and
omestic servants have the right to come under the
•rms of this title by complying with the provisions
f this title and the rules of the commission.

(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Regularly* includes all employments in the
usual course of the trade, business, profession, or
occupation of the employer, whether continuous
throughout the year or for only a portion of the
year.
(b) Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and this work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons
employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and
all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, arc considered employees of the original employer. ,
(c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in
the performance of work as an independent contractor is considered an employer.
(d) . 'Independent contractor" .means any
person, association, or corporation engaged in the
performance of any work for another who, while so
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged
only in the performance of a definite job or piece of
work, and is subordinate io# the employer only in
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design.
i9U

APPENDIX A - 2

35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common lawT or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of km, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing m this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation m those cases withm the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 76; C.L. 1917,
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1.
Cross-References. — Employment of children, § 34-23-1 et seq

Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq
Meaning of "this act". — See the note under the same catchhne following § 35-1-46

APPENDIX A - 3

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917,
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;

L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1: 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973,
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3.
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THE COURT:

86-268, Riddle versus Mays and Mountain

States Insulation.
All right. Counsel, will you identify
yourselves.
MR. HAYES: Your Honor, Nelson Hayes appearing for
the defendants, Mays and Mountain States Insulation.
MR. JENSEN:

Gordon Jensen appearing for Kenneth

Riddle, the plaintiff.
MR. HAYES: Your Honor, it's my motion to dismiss
the case on the basis of workmen's compensation being an
exclusive remedy.

I think in fairness with what has been

offered, I'm not going to spend a lot of time.

I think

we've briefed the subject.
I think it's clear that there is —
that is clear is that there are —

one thing

there is no real

clarity in that area of the law.
THE COURT:

I love arguments like that.

MR. HAYES: Well, Judge Murphy —
a copy of Judge Murphy's decision.

they've attached

And if you read it,

you find that he has some real problems in — with the
case law telling him he should go one way.

And he goes a

different way based on what he perceives is a legislative

3

intent.
The direction I'm going is I think our case
is distinguishable between that case and the other cases
that plaintiffs have cited and falls squarely within the
provisions of the statute. And just let me outline what
the relationships are.
Owens-Corning is a contractor at Bechtel, and
they're involved in insulation projects there. They hire
Mr. Riddlef the plaintiff in the case, and he comes out
from Missouri. And his responsibilities are erecting some
scaffolding and to build a warehouse for Owens-Corning.
THE COURT: Where was he building that?

At the IPP

project?
MR. HAYES: At the IPP project.
the case is here in this court.

I don't know why

But irrespective

—

THE COURT:

I'm not sure either.

MR. HAYES:

But irrespective of why, it's here.

After he's out here for a short period of
time, he contacts his nephew, Mr. Mays, my client. He
contacts his nephew and tells him to come out; that he's
got employment for him here with Owens-Corning
Corporation.
Mr. Mays comes out and spends approximately
three weeks working for Owens-Corning on the same work
that Mr. Riddle was doing, the erecting of scaffolding and

4
building the warehouse.

He's more of a "who me?" or a "go

get this" type of a person as opposed to a skilled
laborer.
THE COURT:

But was actually being paid by

Owens-Corning and a regularly paid employee?
MR. HAYES: Yes. And at some point, unbeknownst to
Mr. Riddle, a contract developed by Owens-Corning — or
he's not even sure therefs a contract —

between

Owens-Corning and Mountain States Insulation.
And he says in his deposition —

he says, "I

don't know that there was a contract."
I asked himf "Wellf let's assume there was a
contract, for a minute. When did they start doing the
work?"
He answered, "I'm not sure."
THE COURT:

"They" being who?

MR. HAYES:

Mountain States Insulation.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. HAYES:

"Stacey Eskelin and Maynard Crossland

drove to the warehouse.

He informed me who he was, and

that they were going to be performing all the work on the
project for Owens-Corning Fiberglass."
The testimony was that at that point,
Mr. Mays, my client, became an employee of Mountain States
Insulation, doing the exact same work* that he had been

5

1

doing moments before for Owens-Corning Fiberglass,
They proceed with Mr. Riddle not performing

2
3

any of the physical functions or the physical labor — the

4

plaintiff —

5

as part of our memorandum, that -his responsibilities were

6

supervision for not only the construction but also for

7

safety of what was taking place; that he had

8

responsibilities of being on the site every day and making

9

sure that what was being done wasn't just for — wasn't

but merely as a supervisor.

And he testified

10

just for what the design was r but to make sure it was done

11

properly.

12

wasn't done properly.

And he had authority to make them redo it if it

The reason this is all material is that to

13
14

fit in with the provisions ojE the statute, it's necessary

15

that there be supervision or control over the contractor's

16

work.

17

mouth of Mr. Riddle himself.

18

Mr. Mays or anyone else. We 've gone right to Mr. Riddle.

19

In his deposition, he said, '"Yes.

20

controlled what was done."

And we think that is quite clear right out of the
We haven't had to go to

I supervised and

21

THE COURT:

By whom?

22

MR. HAYES:

By Mountain States Insulation. And

23

Mr. Mays, in particular, but other Mountain States

24

Insulation employees. They were doing the same thing that

25

he had been doing previously , erecting this scaffolding

6
and building this warehouse.
THE COURT:
working for?

Who was Mountain States Insulation

Were they employed by Corning?

MR. HAYES:

Corning, right. They were a

subcontractor to Owens-Corninq.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. HAYES: And they then took over the employment
or the employer responsibilities of Mr. Mays.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. HAYES: We have the one, then —

the one key.

And there's a whole bunch of provisions, but I'm not going
to take the time to read that.

I think we've laid them

out in our memorandum where he talks about his supervision
of that work and to the extent of being responsible for
the safety that was taking place and the actual
construction.
The second part has to do with that the work
done by the contractor has to be part or process in the
trade or business of the employer.
to the part that I just read.

This is a classic case

One day he's doing it, and

the next day some people arrive, and they're now doing the
exact same thing that he had been doing previously, and
now his function is just to supervise what they're doing.
He's an expert in this area and goes around the country
and erects this scaffolding for this insulation purpose.

7

So we clearly fall within the category of
35-1-42, which establishes for workmen's compensation, the
"statutory employer."
Now, our argument is not that Mountain States
Insulation was an employer of Mr. Riddle. That's not our
argument.

Our argument is that Owens-Corning was the

employer of not only Mountain States Insulation but also
Mr. Mays.
Clearly if Mr. Mays had been the one that was
injured as opposed to Mr. Riddle, he would have been able
to look to Owens-Corning should have Mountain States
Insulation not had appropriate or accessible workmen's
compensation.
Clearly Mr. Mays, under the definition of the
statute, is an employee of Owens-Corning.

By the statute,

35-1-60, it also provides that corporations,
subcontractors, contractors and their employees can be
employees of a contractor for the purposes of the act.
So under the provisions of the statute,
Mountain States Insulation is also an employee of
Owens-Corning for the purposes of workmen's comp.
Even if we don't find them —
don't —

or even if we

or if the Court shouldn't find that Mountain

States Insulation is an employee, clearly Mays is. And
the only way they can get to Mountain' States Insulation in

8

the third-party claim is to claim imputed liability
through the process of respondeat superior.

If they can!t

get to Mr. Mays because hefs an employee or a co-employee
with Mr. Riddle, then they certainly can't get to Mountain
States Insulation because they have to act through their
employees.
Now they raise the argument in this case that
the statute was amended, and that 35-1-62 eliminates this
kind of claim.

The statute reads as follows:

"When an

injury or death for which compensation is payable under
this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of a person other than an employer, officer,
agent" —

and more critical —

"or employee of said

employer."
It's clearly carved out that the act has to
be by someone other than their employer.
Mr. Riddle can't sue Owens-Corning.

Of course

He can't sue their

officers or agents, or he can't sue an employee of said
employer.
Mr. Mays, being an employee of said employer,
is thus immune from suit.

If he's immune from suit,

there's no circumventing that to go around him and sue
Mountain States Insulation, claiming that "although we
can't sue the co-employee, we can sue the co-employee's
employer," so to speak.

9

The reason that that —

this reasoning is

proper is the cases cited by plaintiffs have to do with
the idea that everyone on a project like IPP would thus be
immune from suit if they were —
rationale.

if it would follow our

Or that was their argument.

If ycu follow my

rationale, then everyone is immune from suit.
That doesn't follow because in these
contexts, you have this fellow servant or fellow employee
context that has to fit into it where that the work that
is being done places them in such close proximity, that
there is risk of negligent harm.
In this case, we have exactly that. We have
Mr. Riddle supervising Mr. Mays and the other employees.
They're in close proximity; they're doing the same work.
It's not like someone else on the other side of the plant
performing some other function on the IPP project under
the umbrella of Bechtel, the main contractor. These
provisions are carved out specifically so that those
people working closely together and under each other's
supervision have the protection of workmen's
compensation.
Now, there are some suggestions in
Plaintiff's brief —
now —

and I think I should respond to it

having to do with this concept of up the ladder or

down the ladder —

that there's some distinction there.

10
1
2

And I don't think that's a legitimate distinction.
And the reason I don't think it's a

3

legitimate distinction is if, in fact, Mr. Mays had been

4

the one injured in this case, he would clearly be barred

5

from suing Mr. Riddle. There's no doubt about it. He

6

would be barred because Mr. Riddle was in that supervisory

7

position over him, and he was doing the exact same work

8

that Mr. Riddle had been doing previously.

9

that Mr. Mays can't sue and Mr. Riddle can sue begs the

10
11

To suggest

whole concept of fairness.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Smith

12

versus Alfred Brown, made an interesting statement

13

regarding that. They said:

14

inconsistent with our ideas of even-handed justice to

15

apply a liberal interpretation of the act in order to

16

assure coverage to employees, but if it appears that there

17

is other coverage, to then reverse the policy and apply a

18

restricted view to exclude coverage in order to allow an

19

employee to sue an employer.

20

will best be served and the beneficial purposes of the act

21

will be best accomplished for employees and employers

22

alike, if the statute is applied in a uniform manner,

23

whoever's rights may be at stake."

24
25

"It would be quite

We think the ends of justice

I think that's the whole concept.

To allow

Mr. Riddle to sue Mr. Mays and Mountain States Insulation

11

and not let the reverse happen on the basis of some rigid
concept of going up and down the ladder, I think is
unfair.
Justice Murphy —

and I'm not suggesting, and

I don't believe Plaintiff's counsel is suggesting that the
decision of someone in the Third District has any
precedential value.

But even Judge Murphy recognized that

this idea of up and down the ladder was totally
inconsistent with the findings in Hinds versus Herm
Hughes.
In that case, they allowed to happen just
exactly what we're asking the Court to allow to happen in
this case. And the only reason that he deviated or went
away from it is that he felt like it was inconsistent with
legislative intent.
We don't think so. We don't think that the
legislature intended an unfair result. We think this is
the classic case where Mr. Mays is a co-employee with
Mr. Riddle, and that he should just take and has received
workmen's compensation benefits for his injury.

He should

take those and be barred from third-party action.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. JENSEN:

Thank you.
Gordon Jensen, representing the

plaintiff, Your Honor.
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1

THE COURT: Yes,

2

MR. JENSEN:

I've tried to explain in my memo what

3

I understand this whole concept to be. And I think to

4

understand exactly where we're going, it's important to

5

know the different concepts that are being presented in

6

35-1-42, which is — which defines parties who are liable

7

to pay workmen's compensation benefits, and 35-1-62, which

8

defines the parties who are subject to tort liability for

9

accidents that happen on a job site.

10

Section 42, in defining those people who are

11

subject to pay out workmen's comp benefits, is very, very

12

broad and should be. Because the purpose of that

13

particular statute is to protect anybody on the job site

14

from irresponsible employers who don't have worker's

15

compensation insurance. They can then look up the ladder

16

and tag onto any other above them contractor or general

17

contractor whose work is supervised by that contractor or

18

who exercises the control and is part and parcel of that

19

work that we've talked about that Mr. Hayes has mentioned.

20

The courts have held for a long time that 42

21

should be read very broadly because it's a iremedial

22

statute.

23

hurt on the job.

24
25

It is meant to provide relief for people who get

Section 62, on the other hand, defines those
people who are subject to tort liability from accidents

13

1

that occur on a project. And the history of that statute

2

is really interesting.

3

in right now with regard to what the law has done and what

4

the Supreme Court has. decided in cases like this.

5

It shows kind of a mess that we're

Before 1939, it simply said that you can

6

pursue a claim against any third party who causes your

7

injury.

8
9
10
11

In 19 —

THE COURT:

If it will help you, I've read that --

I've read that portion of your brief, and I understand the
development that you've traced there.
MR. JENSEN:

Thank you.

Let me jump, then, to what

12

has happened kind of recently that's kind of put the thing

13

into kind of a problem.

14

After 1975, it's the plaintiff's position

15

that the amendments that were made in Section 62 were

16

designed to do away with any ambiguity of jumping back and

17

forth between Section 42 and Section 62. And that the

18

amendment to Section 62 specifically said:

19

purposes of this section, and notwithstanding the

20

provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee may

21

also maintain an action for damages against

22

subcontractors, general contractors, independent

23

contractors not occupying an employer/employee

24

relationship with the injured or deceased employee."

25

It's the plaintiff's position that that

"For the

14
amendment allowed a claim against anyone on the project;
not the injured employee's actual employer.

And that

included a claim against a statutory employer up the
ladder.

He could pursue the claim.
What happened unfortunately in the Shupe

decision —

which I think is an important decision, which

is the first decision the Supreme Court decided after the
1975 amendment —

it presented a fact situation just like

the one we have here. A general contractor's employee was
hurt by a subcontractor's employee/ and they pursued the
claim against the subcontractor.
The trial court, relying on all of the
previous opinions which had read the language "same
employment" as basically encompassing everybody on the job
site, granted the motion for summary judgment and said,
"You can't pursue your claim against the subcontractor."
They appealed that to the Supreme Court.
In the interim, from the time of the accident
until the appeal, this statute had been amended.

The

Court said, "In that case, if we're governed by the
amended language of Section 62, we've got to reverse this
summary judgment because it specifically says you can
pursue this claim against the subcontractor."

And it

changed that "same employment" language that kind of made
everybody on the project in the same employment immune

15

from tort liability.
The Court, however, held that the pre-1975
"same employment" language governed; that the amendment
was not retroactive, and they affirmed the motion for
summary judgment.
It's our position that the reasoning of the
Supreme Court now —
language —

certainly the 1975 amendment

applies to this case. And any

THE COURT:

—

Have there been any later cases decided

on that point?
MR. JENSEN:

On the particular down the ladder, a

general suing a subcontractor situation, I have not found
a later decision.
The only decision that's been decided that we
have found is the Hinds versus Herm Hughes decision, which
is an unfortunate case because it throws everything
THE COURT:
MR. JENSEN:

—

Because it doesn't go your way?
No.

I think it —

I don't think it

damages our position here. And Mr. Hayes stated that the
Hinds

—
THE COURT: You think it's factually

distinguisable?
MR. JENSEN:

Yes. Certainly.

The big distinction

is in Hinds versus Herm Hughes, it was a subcontractor
pursuing a claim against an up-the-ladder contractor — a

16
general.
In that case, the Court said, "We think
whether you can pursue your claim up the ladder depends on
whether or not this contractor is your statutory
employer."

Then they threw it back to the definition of

42 and said, "If he!s a statutory employer, then we!re
going to say that your claim is barred," and they sent it
back for a factual determination on whether or not that
general contractor was the injured party's statutory
employer.
I don't think Hinds versus Herm Hughes,
while —

if Mays were pursuing a claim against

Owens-Corning, Hinds versus Herm Hughes would be
precedent, I believe.

He is suing up the ladder, and he

is making a claim.
The Supreme Court has held that when making a
claim like that, whether that person is a statutory
employer is important, and we're going to determine that.
So if it were Ken Riddle pursuing a claim
against Bechtel, or if it were Alan Mays pursuing a claim
against Owens-Corning, I would be in trouble.

Because

Hinds versus Herm Hughes says, "If you're a statutory
employer under those circumstances, we think that is
important."
This is a case that was not —

the case that

17
w e ' r e d e a l i n g with here was n e t addressed in Hinds v e r s u s
Herm Hughes.

We're going down t h e l a d d e r .

And I want t o

t e l l you, Your Honor, why I b e l i e v e t h a t i s c r i t i c a l

in

this particular case.
I t h i n k t h e Shupe reasoning t h a t you can
p u r s u e a c l a i m a g a i n s t your e m p l o y e r ' s s u b c o n t r a c t o r has
n o t been changed by Hinds v e r s u s Herm Hughes.

And i t

s t i l l g o v e r n s , and i t governs t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e .
Mr. Hayes s a i d t h a t Hinds v e r s u s Herm Hughes
was t h i s c a s e .

I t simply i s n ' t t h i s case a t a l l .

We're

going up in Hinds v e r s u s Herm Hughes, and w e ' r e going down
in t h i s c a s e .

I want t o e x p l a i n why I t h i n k t h a t i s very

important.
THE COURT: Why do you think we're going down?
MR. JENSEN:

Because Mountain States Insulation is

a subcontractor of Owens-Corning.
an allegation —
wrong —

I don't believe there's

and Mr. Hayes can correct me if I'm

that Alan Mays is the actual employee —

I mean

there were actual contractive employment payments running
back and forth with Owens-Corning.

He was at one time an

Owens-Corning employee. That employment terminated after
a three-week period or something, and then he went on and
became an employee of Mountain States Insulation.
not paid by Owens-Corning.
payroll at all.

He was

He was not on Owens-Corning's

He was a Mountain States Insulation
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1

employee.

2

THE COURT:

But Mountain States was in a sense —

3

in the statutory sense, the employee of Owens-Corning,

4

wasn ' t it?

5

MR. JENSEN:

I believe, Your Honor, that

6

Owens-Corning —

7

would probably qualify as Mountain States1 statutory

8

employer.

9

pursuing a claim against Owens-Corning.

10

and I don't disagree that Owens-Corning

And that would be important if Mays were

THE COURT: Well, doesn't that make —

11

statutorily, doesn't that make Mays and Riddle

12

co-employees of Owens-Corning?

13

MR. JENSEN:

speaking

It does for purposes of worker's

14

compensation benefits if Mr. Mays were pursuing workmen's

15

comp benefits.

16

insolvent or didn't have workmen's comp benefits, then he

17

could under Section 42, because of the remedial nature of

18

that statute, go as far up the ladder as he could go.

19

Because if Mountain States Insulation was

THE COURT:

Then what do we do about the first line

20

of this 35-1-62 that says you can't pursue this kind of

21

action against a co-employee?

22
23
24
25

MR. JENSEN:
62 or

What it says here —

are you reading

—
THE COURT:

Yes.

62.

"When an injury or death for

which compensation is payable under this title shall have

1 Q

been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person
other than an employer,

officer,

agent,

or employee of

said employer."
MR. JENSEN:

We believe that what they are talking

about, particularly in light of 35-1-62, that says:
the purposes of this section" —

"For

if you'll read further

down there.
THE COURT:
MR. JENSEN:

Yeah. That's the next page.
For purposes of pursuing that

third-party claim and notwithstanding the provisions of
35-1-42 —

meaning notwithstanding that definition of

"employer" —

you can pursue a claim against anybody who

is not in a direct employee/employer relationship with the
injured employee.
Because our position. Your Honor, is that
those two statutes must be separated.
Hinds versus Herm Hughes decision —

And that's why the
that was the whole

purpose of the 1975 amendment was to put an end to this
kind of argument that says, "You're a statutory employee
for this purpose, but you're not a statutory employer or
statutory employer does or doesn't apply on a third-party
claim.

Let's put an end to that."
In the 1975 amendment language,

notwithstanding the definition of "statutory employer," an
injured employee can pursue a claim against anybody not in

20
a direct employer/employee relationship with that injured
employee.
And then in the Hinds versus Herm Hughes
decision, as far as suing somebody up the ladder
THE COURT:

~

Let me just stop you right there. What

you're telling me is, then, if you and I work for the same
boss, and I injure you, you can sue me?
MR. JENSEN:

Absolutely not.

THE COURT: Why not?
MR. JENSEN:

Because you and I are cc-employees of

the same actual employer.
THE COURT:
relationship.

But we're not in an employee/employer

But I'm in an employee/employer

relationship with this
MR. JENSEN:

—

I agree that co-employees of the same

employer cannot pursuit claims against each other.
THE COURT:

And what I'm saying is what is the

difference between that situation and the Riddle/Mountain
States Insulation situation where Mays is actually just an
agent of the subcontractor?

He's an employee of the

subcontractor?
MR. JENSEN:

Because Alan Mays is not in an

employer/employee relationship —
relationship with Owens-Corning.
THE COURT:

Okay.

actual employee/employee

21

MR. JENSEN:

He may be in a statutory employer

relationship, but is not in an actual employer/employee
relationship.

And this is —

it kind of becomes important

when you think about what can happen and the fear.
THE COURT: Where is the definition of
employer/employee relationship as it's used in 62?
MR. JENSEN:
intent —

It is our position and the legislative

if you'll read that memo —

that the legislative

intent of that employer/employee relationship is actually
contractual.

I'm your employee, and I am on your payroll.

THE COURT: What do you cite for that proposition?
MR. JENSEN:

The legislative history of that

statute.
THE COURT:

Read it to me again.

I've read the

memo.
MR. JENSEN:
employment'" —

"This language 'not in the same

this is when he was talking about doing

away with this language. And this is. Your Honor, Paul
Kunz, an AFL/CIO representative.
"This language 'not in the same employment'
has resulted"

—

THE COURT:
intent.

That doesn't sound like legislative

That sounds like some labor organizer's

interpretation.
MR. JENSEN:

What he was doing —

they were asking

22
for the definition of what the intent of this statute
was —

what the purpose was. And I suppose —

I don't

know who sponsored the change, but this is when he came
and said

—

THE COURT:

I remember reading his statement, but

you can go ahead.
MR. JENSEN:

"The object of the change is a matter

of clarification so that the injured man will know that of
course he has no right of action against his own
employer.

But when a stranger comes on the jobf whether

he is a subcontractor or whether it be a stranger of any
kind, that stranger is subject to the same rules of safety
that any other stranger would be."
Your Honor, it becomes kind of clear when you
think of —

now, Mr. Hayes mentioned —

it just doesnft

seem fair, this up and down the ladder thing.
It supports fairness to allow this claim to
go forward for this reason.

Mr. Riddle could never

recover worker's compensation benefits from Mountain
States Insulation.

They exercised no supervisory capacity

or control over Ken Riddle. And that is the definition of
a statutory employer for worker's compensation purposes.
They would never have to pay worker's comp benefits to Ken
Riddle.
THE COURT:

But he can get them from Owens-Corning.

1

MR. JENSEN:

He could get them from his own

2

employer.

3

Riddle is concerned, we cannot be responsible under the

4

statute for worker's compensation benefits, and now we're

5

telling you that we cannot be responsible for tort

6

liability for Ken Riddle either."

7

What they're asking now is that "As far as Ken

They have no obligation to pay benefits; they

8

have no tort liability.

9

was never contemplated by the statute.

10

Certainly that kind of protection

The whole purpose of the exclusive remedy

11

provision is that when you have an employer who is subject

12

to worker's compensation benefit payments, that that ought

13

to be —

14

be immune from tort liability.

15

Owens-Corning; like Bechtel are responsible for worker's

16

compensation benefits; therefore, they should be entitled

17

to this immunity.

or someone who qualifies as that —

18

they ought to

Up the ladder people like

Were Alan Mays pursuing a claim against

19

Owens-Corning, they would be subject to pay him worker's

20

compensation benefits, and therefore, that immunity ought

21

to apply.

22

There is no way that Mountain States would

23

ever be subject to pay worker's compensation benefits to

24

Ken Riddle. And now they're not going to pay that, and

25

now they say we also don't have any tort immunity.

24
THE COURT:

But if we go back to my previous

statement, though, if you and I were working for the same
boss, and I injure you, I don't pay worker's compensation
either, but I enjoy the protections. What is the
difference?
MR. JENSEN:

The difference is if I am injured by

his employer or by someone down the ladder, it's the
purpose of the benefit —

what is the equity or the

fairness in providing them the benefit of tort immunity
when I may have workmen's comp benefits from my own
employer?
THE COURT:

And what is the —

I guess the problem

I'm having is distinguishing between me and you being
employed for the same person and Mountain States and
Riddle being employed for the same person.

It seems to me

it's the same case.
MR. JENSEN:
Honor —

Under "statutory employer," Your

and I think the —

created so much confusion —
may —

Mays and I —

this is the argument that has
I cannot —

I mean Mays

if I am Ken Riddle, under that broad

Section 42 definition of "statutory employer," we may be
able to claim compensation benefits from Owens-Corning

—

both of us.
THE COURT:

I understand that.

I understand that.

But you made the argument that there was some inequity in

1

the fact that Riddle couldn't get employment compensation

2

benefits from Mountain States.

3

anything inequitable.

4

and I are employed for the same boss, I injure you, you

5

have to get your money from the boss, not from me.

6

MR. JENSEN:

I don't see that as

It's the same situation.

If you

But if I am injured by an employee of

7

Mountain States —

for example, if I'm injured by you, and

8

you are an employee with Owens-Corning —

9

collect workmen's comp benefits from Owens-Corning, I

because I can

10

can't pursue a claim against you to recover for my

11

injuries.

12

can't recover workmen's comp benefits from them, and the

13

exclusive remedy applies to my employer, but I ought to be

14

able to puruse a tort claim against that negligent

15

employee of Mountain States. The exclusive remedy

16

provision shouldn't bar that because they don't have to

17

provide benefits.

18

If I'm injured by a Mountain States employee, I

It's our position that the whole "statutory

19

employer" question and the issue of Owens-Corning and Ken

20

Riddle's control over Alan Mays and Mountain States is

21

only applicable were Alan Mays pursuing a claim against

22

Owens-Corning.

23

would be barred as an up-the-ladder statutory employer

24

would be relevant.

25

Then the question of whether his claim

THE COURT:

All right.

I think I understand your

26

position.

I wish I knew the answer.

MR. HAYES:

Could I just point a couple things

THE COURT:

Are you finished, Mr. Jensen?

out?

MR. JENSEN:

I just —

I guess I just want to say

that it is kind of frustrating because of some of the
questions that have been —

we're kind of in the same

dilemma, I think, that Judge Murphy was in in his
decision.
He said that n I understand what I think the
'75 language was supposed to do, and it was to preserve
all claims."

But now the Supreme Court has said that this

issue of "statutory employer" is relevant in determining a
claim —

it is the plaintifffs position only if youfre

pursuing a claim up the ladder —

and that is why he

denied that motion.
He said:

"To grant this motion" —

"to grant

this motion, completely obliterates anything that the 1975
amendment was supposed to do."
There is not a situation where you could
pursue a third-party claim on a job site.
situation.

There's not a

The whole language of Section 62 becomes void

because you cannot pursue a claim.

Because everybody

starting from the lowest level subcontractor all the way
to Bechtel —• everybody technically is a statutory

27

co-employee of that general contractor.
the line there is immunity.

All the way down

And that was what the '75

amendments were supposed to remedy, and now we1 re back in
that situation again.

If we grant this motion, we're back

in a situation where nobody can pursue a third-party tort
claim against anybody on the job site. Certainly not the
intent of the legislature.
THE COURT:

Well, I don't quite view it that way.

I don't think to grant the motion in this case would
dictate that result.

I mean I don't think that granting

this motion would necessarily mean that nobody on that job
site would be responsible to Mr. Riddle if they hit him.
MR. JENSEN:
situation

Could you —

I cannot think of a

—

THE COURT:

I can. Anybody that does not work for

Owens-Corning.
MR. HAYES:

The supervision and work done is part

of the process of trade.
THE COURT:

Everyone outside of that —

Anybody who does not work for

Owens-Corning.
MR. JENSEN:

If you will look at the cases — the

Smith decision and the cases that were decided before the
1975 amendments —
is —

they held that a general contractor

a general contractor is deemed to have supervision

and control over everybody on the project.
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1

THE COURT:

I'm aware of that.

I'm not applying

I fm saying that anybody who is not an actual

2

the 42 test.

3

employee o f Owens-Corning who injured an employee of

4

Owens-Corn ing unde r the 62 language that you cited could

5

probably b<s sued.

6

MR. JENSEN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. JENSEN:

9

THE COURT:

10
11
12
13

That's exactly what Alan Mays is.
That's where I differ with you.
I don't understand, then.
I think Alan Mays is an employee of

Owens-Corn ing.
MR. JENSEN:

Under the "statutory employer"

definition'p
THE COURT:

Well, even more under that —

14

that, in view of the fact that he was an —

15

for an ent.ity that was clearly in a contractual

16

relationsh.ip with Owens-Corning —

17

you want to call i t that, under a contractual

18

relationsh.Lp, receiving direct payments.
I don ft think —

19

more than

he was working

an actual employee, if

given what you've said

20

there, Mr. Riddle can't pursue any claim against Mountain

21

States; so , what is —

22

correct?

23
24
25

MR. JENSEN:

No.

that is your position; is that

I think he can pursue any claim

he wants against Moutain States.
THE COURT:

Well, my feeling is that he wouldn't be

'
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able to because they're employed by the same employer.
Even though one may be deemed an independent contractor/
there's an actual employment relationship there.
MR. JENSEN:
other —

Kow would that differ from any

and I certainly don't want to be argumentative.

THE COURT:

No. This is a puzzle to me.

So any

help you can give me would be appreciated.
MR. JENSEN:

How would that differ from any other

subcontracted relationship on the project?

I don't

understand the difference between Owens-Corning
subcontracting out certain insulation installation and any
other contractor subcontracting out labor on any other
part of their project.
THE COURT: Well/ I see a distinction there. I
think you can draw a distinction there.
MR. HAYES: Well/ that's why Hinds/ I think -- you
know, he doesn't agree with me that Hinds tells us that.
But the reason that Hinds does is the Court goes back and
looks and saysf "Well/ do you want to go up the ladder or
down the ladder?"
They're saying if Mr. Mays is in this
position/ he can get his workmen's compensation from
Owens-Corning, but because he's an employee/ he can't sue
Owens-Corning.

That's why Hinds is important to this

particular case.

I
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1

The Court looked for the determination of

2

whether he could sue Owens-Corning to Section 42 to say

3

he's an employee.

4

this case. And that is a decision after Shupe where the

5

Court in dicta said "We're not considering what the

6

amendments would dof this is what we're going to do based

7

on the old case that was dieted."

8

with Hinds and saidf "This is how we're going to decide

9

these cases on who is an employee."

10

He can'tf and that's why it applies to

And then they came out

The other thing I think important is equity.

11

And he's saying that the equity is against us because he

12

can't sue MCI. The reason he can't sue MCI is that — it

13

has to do with this concept of supervision.

14

under the supervision of Owens-Corning.

15

equitable.

16

and how to do it, they're the employer, and they're the

17

ones responsible. Why should MCI get stuck when they're

18

not the one that is calling the shots, even though they're

19

a separate and distinct entity on the contract?

20

They are

That is why it is

If someone is telling you what to do out there

It's a tough question, but I think this case

21

fits in nicely to Section 62 where it says if you're an

22

employee, you're barred from suing a fellow employee. I

23

think it fits right there.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. JENSEN:

Okay.
Well, Your Honor, I think we made our
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position pretty clear.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll tell you what. As I read

your briefs, I read, of course, the defendants1 brief
first and thought "Well, good point.
that motion.11
shouldn't."

I ought to grant

And then I read yours and thought "No, I

And Ifm back to my original position.
I'm going to grant the motion to dismiss,

deny the motion for summary judgment, and let the Court of
Appeals figure it out.
MR. JENSEN:

Can we just clarify should it be

designed like a motion for summary judgment rather than a
motion to dismiss?

I think, you know —

THE COURT: Well, it's entitled a "Motion to
Dismiss."

I guess in actuality, it's a motion for summary

judgment.
MR. HAYES: Yes. When we use the deposition of
Mr. Riddle, I think —

and that's fine.

I'll prepare the

order.
THE COURT:
MR. JENSEN:
appeal

All right.
Just to know how to designate an

—
THE COURT:

Now, I've decided opposite from Judge

Murphy, haven't I?
MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:

Yes, you have.
Good.

The Court of Appeals is going to

32
have to give us some answers.
MR. JENSEN:

Thank youf Your Honor.

MR, HAYES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you, gentlemen.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the
above-entitled matter were concluded.)
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APPENDIX C

GORDON K. JENSEN - A4 351
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH RIDDLE,

'
i
Plaintiff,
i
i
vs.
)
)
ALAN MAYS, and MOUNTAIN >
STATES INSULATION CORP., ,
a Utah corporation,
i
i
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS AND IN SUFPORT
OF HIS CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 86-268
Judge J. Phillip Eves

The plaintiff submits this Memorandum in Opposition
to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in support of his
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment thatf as a matter of law,
the defense of exclusive remedy is not available to the
defendants.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Bechtel was the general contractor at the

Intermountain Power Project ("IPP").
2.

Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation ("Owens-

Corning") was an insulation subcontractor at IPP to install

insulation and paneling and to erect a warehouse.

(Riddle

depo., pp.11/15).
3.
Owens-Corning.
4.

The plaintiff, Kenneth Riddle, was employed by
(Riddle depo., pp.10,15).
Owens-Corning sub-subcontracted with Mountain

States Insulation Corp. ("MSI") for MSI to provide labor to
erect the warehouse.
5.
MSI.

(Riddle depo., p.18).

The defendant Alan Mays was an employee of

(Defendants' Statement of Facts; Riddle depo.,

pp.19,94).
6.

The plaintiff was injured at IPP when the

parked truck he was sitting in was hit by a truck driven by
the defendant Alan Mays.

Both men were working when the

accident happened.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPLICABLE STATUTES, CASE LAW AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM AGAINST MSI AND, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DEFENSE
IS NOT AVAILABLE TO MSI
MSI claims that the plaintiff and MSI are statutory
co-employees of Owens-Corning and, therefore, the plaintiff's
tort claim against MSI is barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60.

MSI bases its claim

on the language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(b) ("Section

42").

The defendants' memorandum does not, however, address

the effect of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 ("Section 62"). A
clear understanding of the relationship between these two
statutory provisions is essential in deciding the issues
presented by these motions.
distinct purposes.

Section 42 and Section 62 have

Section 42 defines those liable for

worker's compensation benefits.

Section 62 defines those

parties against whom an injured worker may pursue tort
claims.
Section 42 represents a class of statutes known as
"statutory employer" statutes.

The purpose of such statutes

is to allow injured workers to reach beyond irresponsible,
uninsured employers by imposing ultimate liability for
benefits on "up the ladder" contractors.

Jacobson v.

Industrial Commission, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah App. 1987).

The

entire "statutory employer" scheme indicates a desire on the
part of the legislature to extend the protection of worker's
compensation benefits to those who might not be deemed
employees under the common law.
Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984).

Pinter Construction Co. v.
The remedial purpose of

the Worker's Compensation Act supports the conclusion that
Section 42 should be construed in favor of protecting the
injured employee.

Bennett v. Industrial Comm., 726 P.2d 427

(Utah 1986).
3

Section 42, therefore, expands the definition of
those liable for worker's compensation benefits beyond the
injured worker's actual employer.

It creates the concept of

the "statutory employer" who, although not the actual
employer of the injured worker, so controls and supervises
that worker's actual employer as to become liable for
compensation benefits.

This concept provides more assurance

that benefits will be available to an injured worker if his
actual employer proves irresponsible and uninsured.

It also

pressures general contractors to make sure subcontractors are
insured.
Section 62 allows tort claims by injured employees
against third parties.

Before 1939, Section 62 allowed an

injured worker to pursue tort claims against a neglignt
"third person."

In 1939, the "third person" language was

changed to allow claims against "another person not in the
same employment" as the injured employee.

This was designed

to protect the injured worker's actual employer and coemployees because the employer was liable to the injured
worker for worker's compensation benefits under Section 42.
After the 1939 amendments to Section 62, something
unforeseen and unintended by the legislature began to happen.
To determine who was "in the same employment" as the injured
worker under Section 62, the Utah Supreme Court began
4

applying the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42.
In other words, the Court applied the Section 42 expanded
definition of employer, used to define those liable to pay
worker's compensation benefits, to determine who was "in the
same employment" as the injured worker and, therefore, immune
from tort liability under Section 62. The practical effect
of these court decisions was to insulate from tort liability
everybody on the construction project.

This was because, as

a practical matter, under Section 42, all workmen on a
project had a common statutory employer, usually the general
contractor.

Therefore, all were deemed to be "in the same

employment"

under Section 62 and unable to pursue claims

against each other, whether up or down the ladder.

See

Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d
805 (1973); Smith v. Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994
(1972); Galleqos v. Strinqham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31
(1968).

Section 62, specifically allowing third party

claims, was becoming meaningless.
In 1975, the Utah Legislature moved to reestablish
its initial intent and to remedy the injustice created by
these judicial decisions.

At that time, the Legislature

amended Section 62 to clarify who was subject to third-party
liability suits.

The "same employment" language, which had

5

created generalized immunity, was changed to read that a tort
claim could be maintained against a person "other than an
employer, officer, agent or employee of said employer."
Then, in a very significant addition, the Legislature added
the following language to Section 62:
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of section
35-1-42, the injured employee . . . may
also maintain an action for damages
against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors . . . not
occupying an employer-employee relationship with the injured or deceased
employee . . . [Emphasis added.]
The language and legislative intent of these 1975
amendments are clear.

The liberal definition of "statutory

employer" in Section 42, used to determine liability for
compensation benefits, is not to be used in determining who
is or is not subject to tort liability under Section 62. The
judicially-created interplay between Section 42 and Section
62 was expressly eliminated.

The injured worker's tort claim

was preserved against all those "not occupying an employeremployee relationship" with the injured employee.
The legislative history of the 1975 amendments is
equally clear that only the employee's actual employer was to
be protected from tort liability.

On February 25, 1975, the

Senate moved to a Committee of the Whole to have the

6

amendments explained by Mr. Paul Kunz, an AFL-CIO representative.

He stated, in part:
Kunz: . . . [T]his language . . . "not
in the same employment" has resulted in a
number of court decisions that have
completely eliminated the protection that
the worker had. . . . [T]he object of the
change . . . is a matter of clarification so that the injured man will know
that of course he has no right of action
against his own employer, but when a
stranger comes on the job, whether -it be
a subcontractor . . . or whether it be a
stranger of any kind, that stranger is
subject to the same rules of safety . . .
that any other stranger would be.
In Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 54& P.2d 896

(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 1975
amendments to Section 62 as they relate to an injured
worker's ability to sue "downstream" subcontractors (such as
MSI in this case).

In Shupe, the heirs of a deceased

employee of the general contractor brought a wrongful death
action against a subcontractor.

The accident happened before

the 1975 amendments which eliminated the "same employment"
language from Section 62.
Applying the "same employment" language and
following the judicial precedent of Adamson, Smith, etc., the
trial court found that the general contractor's employee and
the subcontractor were "in the same employment" and granted
summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor based on

7

exclusive remedy.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

explained that the summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor would have to be reversed if the 19 7 5 amendments
to Section 62, specifically allowing tort claims against nonemployers, applied.

The Court held the amendments not

retroactive and affirmed.
The bottom line of the Shupe decision is that after
1975, an injured worker may sue a subcontractor of his
employer.

The exclusive remedy defense does not apply to the

subcntractor.

Riddle may, therefore, pursue his claim

against MSI as a matter of law.
The plaintiff acknowledges that after Shupe, the
majority in Hinds v. HermeS Hughes, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah
1978) held that, when considering "up-the-ladder" tort
claims, the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42 is
relevant in determining who is an employer and immune from
tort liability under Section 62. Hinds is an unfortunate
decision.

Regarding suing "up the ladder," it throws the law

back to its pre-1975 status. It fails to acknowledge the
language and intent of the Legislature in enacting the 1975
amendment to Section 62, and overlooks the language of Shupe.
Regardless of the consequences Hinds may have on
"up-the-ladder" tort claims, it does not

affect the plain-

tiff's ability to pursue his claim against MSI.
8

The clear

language of Shupe, allowing "downstream" tort claims, was not
altered by the Hinds decision.
To grant the defendants' motion would render the
1975 amendment to Section 62 meaningless.

As stated in

Hinds , the 1975 amendment "enables an employee to sue a
tortfeasor, not his employer (or the employer's agent, etc.),
even though the injured person and the tortfeasor may be
engaged in the same employment."

Icl. at 562. MSI argues

that it is immune from tort liability because Riddle and MSI
are statutory co-employees under Section 42.

Under the

liberal language of Section 42, all workers on the jobsite
are statutory employees of "up-the-ladder" contractors.
Under those circumstances, everyone on the jobsite would be
immune from tort liability and the 1975 amendment to Section
62, specifically allowing tort claims against non-employers,
would be meaningless. So would the Shupe and Hinds opinions,
which provide that an injured worker is able to sue a
tortfeasor who is not his employer.
Finally,* MSI's position does not comport with the
quid pro quo concept behind the Worker's Compensation Act.
The concept is that statutory employers are granted immunity
from suit because, in being subject to providing worker's
compensation, they assure qualifying workers a recovery.
Downstream subcontractors like MSI, with no supervision or
9

control over the plaintiff, have no liability for compensation benefits to the plaintiff and, therefore, there is no
quid pro quo.

MSI is not entitled to benefit from the

exclusive remedy provision of the worker's compensation
statute.

If such benefit is allowed, MSI has neither the

obligation to pay compensation benefits nor any exposure to
tort liability.

That type of protection was never con-

templated by the Act.
The issues presented by these motions were recently
addressed by Judge Michael Murphy of the Third Judicial
District Court.

A copy of Judge Murphy's Summary Decision

and Order in that matter is attached for the Court's review.
In that case, Judge Murphy denied a motion for summary
judgment made, as is the case here, by a "downstream"
subcontractor alleging that the plaintiff and the subcontractor were statutory co-employees under Section 42 and that the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was worker's compensation.
Judge Murphy then granted the plaintiff's motion that, as a
matter of law, the-exclusive remedy defense was not available
to the subcontractor.
Based on the above arguments, the defendants'
motion to dismiss should be denied and this Court should
rule, as a matter of law, that the defense of exclusive
remedy is not available to MSI.
10

POINT II
ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE ISSUE
OF OWENS-CORNING'S CONTROL OVER MSI IS RELEVANT
TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION,
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUEE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Point II is to be considered only if the Court
rejects the plaintiff's position in Point I.

MSI's motion

focuses on the supervision and control exercised by OwensCorning over MSI.

The plaintiff argues that, for the

purposes of this motion, the control, if any, exercised by
Owens-Corning over MSI is irrelevant-

As explained in Point

I of this memorandum, MSI, as a "downstream" subcontractor
exercising no control over the plaintiff, is not entitled to
the exclusive remedy defense.

The only way MSI can escape

tort liability in this case is to show that it was the actual
employer or, under Hinds, the statutory employer (although
the plaintiff disagrees with the Hinds majority), of Riddle.
Clearly, MSI was not the actual employer of Riddle.

Whether

MSI was a "statutory employer" depends on the supervision and
control it exercised over Riddle.

As a downstream sub-

contractor, MSI had no right of control over the Riddle.
Owens-Corning's control over MSI is irrelevant.
If, despite this argument, this Court determines
that the issue of Owens-Corning's control over MSI is somehow
relevant in deciding the defendants' motion, genuine issues
11

of fact exist regarding that control which preclude summary
judgment.
the jury.

The question of control is a question of fact for
Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982).
As stated by the defendants, it is the right to

control rather than the actual exercise of control that
determines the relationship between the parties.
supra at 309.

Pinter,

The right to control is usually found in the

language of a written contract between the parties.

No such

written contract exists between Owens-Corning and MSI and,
therefore, the right to control must be determined by other
factors.
Many factors have been applied in determining the
right to control.

Among those factors are actual supervision

of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method of
payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker, and the
right to terminate the worker.

Bennett v. Industrial

Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
Ken Riddle testified at his deposition that:

(1)

he did not supervise the work of Alan Mays (p.19); (2)
Maynard Crossland, a part owner of MSI, supervised and
instructed Mays (p.19); (3) Riddle had no authority to fire
Mays without the approval of Maynard Crossland (p.94); and
(4) MSI, not Owens-Corning, paid Mays from MSI's payroll
(p.95).

It only takes one

sworn statement under oath to
12

dispose of the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of fact. W.W. and W.B. Gardner, Inc. v.
Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984).

The sworn deposition

testimony of the plaintiff is sufficient to create issues of
fact regarding Owens-Corning's right to control MSI and
precludes the granting of defendant's motion.
CONCLUSION
Based on Point I, MSI, as a matter of law, is not
entitled to the defense' of exclusive remedy.

The defendants'

motion should be denied and the plaintiff's cross-motion for
summary judgment disposing, as a matter of law, of the
exclusive rememdy defense, should be granted.
Owens-Corning's control over MSI is irrelevant to
the issues to be decided by this Court.

Should the Court,

however, determine that Owens-Corning's control over MSI is
somehow relevant, the defendants' motion should be denied
.sues of fact exist regarding tl
because genuine issues
that control
lis
DATED thj

f / ^ d a y of

lMffi/c//\

1988.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
foregoing
this
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1988,
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folic.owing:

Nelson Hayes
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
You are instructed that the term "Distribution for Value" means to deiiver a
controlled substance in exchange for
compensation, consideration, or item of
value, or a promise therefor.
You are instructed that under the lawmarijuana is a controlled substance.
The first paragraph of Instruction 6B
incorporates, in haec verba, provisions of
76-2-202. It is applicable here, because
the Controlled Substance Act does not specifically provide otherwise, nor does its
context otherwise require.
Instruction 6A defines a misdemeanor,
Instruction 6 a felony. The jury was given two verdicts, one responding to Instruction 6A and one responding to Instruction
6. The jury, having an opportunity to
consider both, elected to return a verdict in
response to No. 6.
[2] A further' contention of defendant
is that it was improper to give Instruction
63 since there was no factual basis on
which to ground an instruction concerning
aiding and abetting. State v. Bairn:1 is cited as authority for this contention. The
case is distinguishable from the present
one, in that here there was conflicting evidence from which the jury couid have
found defendant aided and abetted. In
Bcum i: was otherwise, the court noting:
. . . There was no evidence to
show, and no one claimed, that the defendant but aided or abetted in the commission of the offense, or, not being
present, advised or enco'uraged its commission.
In view of there being no such evidence,
the court held that to give such a charge
was misleading and harmful.
Here there was testimony o: the undercover agent that his discussions preceding
the saie. were with defendant, but at the
time of the saie one Gooch brought the
package from the kitchen and demanded an
I.

extra $5 as a condition to transfer. Defendant testified he was not involved with
the transaction, although he was present,
and for unknown reasons the agent handed
the money to him. Since all parties agreed
that Gooch was an active participant m the
sale, and the evidence concerning defendant's role was sharply conflicting, an instruction on aiding and abetting was proper.
KEXRIOD, C. J., and
ELLETT,
CROCKETT and T U C K E T T , TJ., concur.

Elna A. SHUPE, and Yavette Shupe, by and
through her guardian ad litem, Elna A.
Shupe, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Y.

WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., a
Utah Corporation, and Esco Corporation,
an Oregon Corporation, Defendants and
Respondents.
No.

14117.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 20, 1976.

Wrongful death action was brought
against electrical subcontractor by wife
and daughter of deceased employee of general contractor. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, L,
granted defense motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, T., held that deceased was in ''same employment" within prior
statute to effect that, when death for
which compensation is payable shall have
been caused by wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in same employment,
dependents may claim compensation and
his heirs or personal representatives may
also have action for damages against such

47 Utah 7. IZ1 P. ZIS

(l91o).

SHUPE r. WASATCH ELECTPJC COMPANY, INC.

Utah

S97

Cite as 546 P.2d 8&6

third person and that later statutory
amendment authorizing personal representatives of deceased employee to maintain
action against subcontractor not occupying
employee-employer relationship with deceased could not apply.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Workmen's Compensation C=2i66
General contractor's workman, who
was electrocuted, was in the "same employment" as electrical subcontractor, within prior statute providing that when death
for which compensation is payable shall
have been caused by wrongful act or neglect of another person not in same employment, his dependents may claim compensation and his heirs or personal representatives may also have action for damages against such third persons; thus wife
and daughter of deceased workman were
not entitled to recover from subcontractor
on theory that electrocution had been due
to subcontractor's negligence.
U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-42, 35-1-62, 6S-3-3.
2. Workmen's Compensation C = 5 8

TUCKETT,

Justice:

This is a wrongful death action brought
by the plaintiffs who are the wife and
daughter of a deceased workman who was
m the employ of Christiansen Brothers
Construction Company. The district court
granted a motion for summary judgment
by the defendants, and the plaintiffs appeal.
Christiansen Brothers Construction Company was a general contractor engaged in
the construction of condominiums in Salt
Lake City, Utah. The defendant Wasatch
Electric Company was a subcontractor who
agreed to design, furnish and install all
the necessary electrical wiring and equipment at the construction site. Prior to
July 19, 1974, Wasatch had installed electrical cables for the purpose of supplying
power to a crane owned and operated by
Esco Corporation. On July 19, 1974, Tom
Shupe, a carpenter, was employed by the
general contractor and was performing
carpentry work on the construction site.
The electrical cable had been draped over
certain metal forms and reinforcing steel.
Due to defective or insufficient insulation
of the cables, electrical energy escaped
from the cables and energized certain metal
cement forms that Shupe was working
with, resulting in his electrocution.

Statute providing that injured employee or his heirs or personal representatives
may maintain action for damages against
[1] Plaintiffs
filed their complaint
subcontractors, general contractors, indepursuant to the provisions of Section 35pendent contractors, property owners or
1-62, U.C.A.1953, the pertinent part of
other lessees or assigns, not occupying an
which reads as follows:
employee-employer relationship with deWhen any injury or death for which
ceased employee at time of his death did
compensation is payable under this title
not apply retroactively to case of death of
shall have been caused by the wrongful
general contractor's employee who was *
act or neglect of another person not in
electrocuted allegedly as result of negiect
the same employment, the injured emo: electrical subcontractor.
U.C.A.1953,
ployee, or in case of death his depen35-1-62, 6S-3-3.
dants, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal
representatives may also have an action
for damages against such third person.
D. Clayton Fairbourn, Sal: Lake City,
for plaintiffs and appellants.
Richard K. Moffat, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
546 P.2c—57

The term ''same employment" used in the
statute has oeen defined by this court in a
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number of prior decisions. The case of
A damson v. Okland Construction Co.1 was
a wrongful death case wherein the plaintiffs decedent who was an employee of a
subcontractor sought to recover from the
general contractor. Likewise in Smith z\
Alfred Brown Co} the plaintiff, an employee ox the subcontractor, sued the general contractor to recover for injury sustained on the job. In both of those cases
the general contractor, by the terms of the
contracts, retained supervision and control over the subcontractors. The provisions of Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.1953,
which defines employers who are subject
to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, provides coverage for the
employees of subcontractors where supervision or control is retained by the employer who employed the subcontractor, and
all such persons employed by such subcontractors shall be deemed to be employees of the original employer. In Smith
and A damson above referred to the contract provisions providing for control and
supervision of subcontractors for the general contractor are quite similar to contract provisions in this case. We do not
believe that in this case the plaintiffs'
decedent was an employee of the general
contractor rather than being an employee
of the subcontractor as was the case in
Smith and A damson, is a sufficient distinction to take the case out of the rule
enunciated in those cases.
The legislature, undoubtedly being aware
of the decisions of this court construing the
terms "same employment" in 1975 amended Section 35-1-62. U.C.A.1953, by adding
the following provision:
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or
his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages
!. 29 Utah 2d 256, 50S P.2d SOZ.
2. 27 Utah 2d 155. 493 P.2d 994.

2d

SERIES

against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property
owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or
death.
The amendment if applicable would leave
the plaintiffs in court.
The defendants contend that the amendment can have only retrospective effect
and that the amendment was adopted and
became effective after the plaintiffs' cause
of action arose. The early case of Mcrcur
Gold M. & M. Co. v. Spry 3 dealt with the
problem in the following language:
Constitutions, as well as statutes,
should operate prospectively only, unless
the words employed show a clear intention that they should have a retrospective
effect. This rule of construction as to
statutes should always be adhered to,
unless there be something on the face
of the statute putting it beyond doubt
that the legislature meant it to operate
retrospectively.
The rule in that case has been codified in
Section 6S-3-3, U.C.A.1953, which reads as
follows:
No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
[2] The amendment above referred to
provides a cause of action on behalf of
an injured workman against individuals
not covered by the statute prior to its
amendment. To apply the statute retroactively would compel a new class of individuals to assume risks which did not
exist prior to the amendment, and we are
of the opinion that retroactive application
would deny equal protection to a new class
brought within the terms o: the statute as
amended so as to deprive them of equal
protection of the laws.
3. IG Utah 222. 52 P. 3S2 ; In re hxc-ahavis
Estate, 106 Utah S3T. 14S ?.2d 340; Petty
r. Clark, 113 Utah 205. 192 P.2d 5S9.
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contractor, and all persons employed by
him, and all subcontractors under him,
shall be deemed, within the meaning of
this section, employees of such original
employer. . . .

The other contentions of the plaintiffs as
grounds for a reversal we deem to be without merit.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed. No costs awarded.
HENRIOD,
J-, concur.

C. J., and

CROCKETT,

MAUGKAN, Justice (dissenting):
For the following reasons, I dissent:
The issue in this matter is whether under Section 35-1-62, U.C.A.19S3, a subcontractor is a third person "not in the
same empoyment," with an employee of a
general contractor. The majority opinion
relies on A damson v. Okland Construction
Companyl
and Smith v. Alfred Brown
Company2 and holds them applicable in
the instant fac: situation. In both these
cases, a general contractor was held to be
the statutory employer under Section 351-42(2) of the employees of a subcontractor and therefore not within the exception
set forth in Section 35-1-62—distinguishable situations.
The language of Section 35-1-42 clearly
shows the legislative intent. The initial
sentence provides:
The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title:
Title is the key word here. Thus the definitions of Section 42 insofar as a "statutory employer" is involved is to be applied
to the entire act. In contrast, subsection 2
provides those who are to be deemed "statutory employees" are made so only for
the purposes of that section. Section is
hert the key word. The pertinent provisions of subsection 2 are:

The legislature specifically has expressed an intention that its definition of a
statutory
employer
remain
constant
throughout the Workmen's Compensation
Act. In contrast, its definition of who
are statutory employees is e:** ressly confined to those provisions whc-ein the responsibility flowing to them from the statutory employer is set forth.
The definition of a third person "not in
the same employment" is not the subject
of 35-1-42(2). The concept of "all persons
in the same employment" does not include
subcontractors, and their employees, on the
same project; thus they are not immune
as co-employees of an employee of a general contractor. 3
The legislature in enacting Section 251-42 was not concerned with third-party
tort liability; its purpose was to establish
a general statutory definition of an employer, to assure that a general contractor
would guarantee compensation for the employees of a subcontractor. Where a statute such as Section 35-1-42 makes the
general contractor the employer for purposes of the compensation statute certainly
he should enjoy the regular immunity of
an employer from third-party suit when
the facts are such that he could be made
liable for compensation. The majority of
courts have so heid.4
the overall responsibility of
the general contractor for getting subcontractors insured, and his latent liability for compensation if he does not,
should be sufficient to remove him from
the category of "third party." He is
under a continuing potential liability; he
has thus assumed a burden in exchange
for which he might well be entitled to

Where any employer procures any
work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work
he retains supervision or control and
such work is a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer, such
1. 29 Utah 2d 256. 50$ P.2d S03 (1973).
2. 27 Utah 2d 153, 493 P.2c 994 (1972).

3. 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law,
Section 72.20. pp. 14-44 to 14-46.
4

Id., Section 72.31 p. 14-47.
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immunity from damage suits, regardless
of whether on the facts of a particular
case actual liability exists. This burden
may also be translated into financial
terms. . . . The general contractor,
by insisting that the subcontractor carry
compensation insurance, imposes a cost
on the subcontractor which the subcontractor will pass on to the contractor in
his charges under the subcontract. 5
When the positions are reversed, and
an employee of the general contractor,
or the general contractor himself as subrogee sues the subcontractor in negligence, the great majority of jurisdictions have held that the subcontractor is
a third party amenable to suit. The
reason for the difference in result is
forthright: the general contractor has
a statutory liability to the subcontractor's
employee, actual or potential, while the
subcontractor has no comparable statutory liability to the general contractor's
employee.6
Frohlick Crane Service, Inc. v. Mack " is
factually similar to the instant action.
There, an empioyet of the genera] contractor sued the subcontractor for negligence.
The trial court dismissed the action on the
ground that plaintiff was suing his coerr.pioyee, and such suit was no: permissible
under a statute which permits an employee
to bring an action against a person "not
in the same employ." The ruiing of the
trial court was predicated on a statute
which provided that an employer, who contracts part of his work to a subcontractor,
is deemed to be the employer of the subcontractor and his employees for Workmen's Compensation purposes.

for statutory interpretation must be governed by legislative intent. The purpose
of the Workmen's Compensation Act was
to afford compensation for work-related
injuries, regardless of fault. The employer, in return for his responsibility under the act is granted immunity for common-law claims, but the act does not shield
third-party tort feasors. To prevent an
employer from avoiding responsibility under the act by contracting his work to an
uninsured contractor, the statute provides
that a subcontractor and his employees
are deemed to be the employees of such an
employer. These provisions do not indicate a legislative intention that a subcontractor should be free of responsibility for
his own negligence. The court held, in
accordance with the great weight of authority, that subcontractors are subject to
suit by employees of the general contractor.
A valuable common-law right should
not be deemed destroyed by a statute, except by explicit language. The instant
action is not a case where the claimant's
right to compensation is dependent upon
labeling the general contractor as a statutory employer.
The proper interpretation of the phrase
"not in the same employment" (35-1-62),
in the absence of a true employer-employee
relationship, renders a subcontractor a
third party not immune to a common-law
negligence action by an employee of the
general contractor.
This cause should be reversed, and remanded for trial on its merits.

The Supreme Court of Colorado stated
that to treat the two parties as co-employees would be exalting form over substance,

ELLZTT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Maughan.

5. Id.. Section 72.C1, pp. 14-55 to 14-56.

7. Colo.. 510 P.2d S91 (1973).

6. Id., Section 72.32. pp. 14-66 to 14-6S.
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Utah Code Ann., and plaintiff's exclusive remedy under Section
35-1-60 is workers1 compensation.

The court took the matter

under advisement following a hearing on February 22, 1983.
Paulsen Engineering & Construction Company ("Paulsen") was
the

general

injured.
Inc.

contractor

on

the project

where

plaintiff

was

Paulsen subcontracted with Mechanical Construction,

("MCI") for plumbing services. MCI in turn subcontracted

with Western for construction of heating, ventilation and air
conditioning facilities.

Plaintiff was an employee of MCI.

This court previously granted Paulsen's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Paulsen was a statutory employe*^ and
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1973)
mandated workers1 compensation as plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
Western now argues that the inexorable extension of the ruling on
Paulsen's motion

requires

the granting

of its motion.

The

resolution of this issue presents a very difficult balancing of
this court's obligation to adhere to both judicial precedent and
clear legislative mandate.

This resolution must begin with an

analysis of the Hinds decision.
As

acknowledged

in

this

court's

previous

ruling,

the

majority opinion in Hinds did not ignore the 197 5 amendments to
Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Ann.

The Court quoted the amended

section and then indicated its import:
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This amendment enables an employee to sue a
tortfeasor, not his employer (or the employer's agent,
etc.), even though the injured person and the
tortfeasor may be engaged in the same employment.
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., supra at 562.
Even though it appeared that Section 35-1-62, as amended, would
allow the employee/plaintiff to sue the statutory employer who
was not his actual employer, the Court did not apply Section 3 51-62 to override Sections 35-1-42 and -60.

No explanation was

given by the Court and the decision presented

no analytical

framework for lower courts to determine the applicability of
Section 35-1-62 in cases presenting different fact situations.
One

matter,

however,

is

clear,

i.e.,

the

Court

indirectly

acknowledged the amendments to Section 3 5-1-62 effected a change
in the doctrine flowing from the previous statutory language "not
in the same employment.ff
Section 3 5-1-62, as amended, then, must be considered by
this court as effecting some change in the previous statutory
scheme as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court.
were to

determine

that the Hinds decision

If this court

and this

court's

previous ruling on the Paulsen motion required the granting of
Western's motion for summary judgment, the 1975 amendments to
Section 35-1-62 would have no effect whatsoever, and immunity
would blanket the workplace.

The Hinds decision by its reference

to Section 35-1-62 suggests otherwise but fails to provide the

BARBOUR V. WESTERN
SHEET METAL

PAGE FOUR

SUMMARY DECISION

analytical framework to determine the nature and extent of the
amendmentsf effect.
This court is left with judicial precedent indicating the
19 75

amendments

constitute

some

legislative

change

and

a

statutory enactment dictating that plaintiff is net precluded
from proceeding against Western.

In this circumstance, the court

must adhere to the latter legislative dictates and deny Western's
motion.

Such adherence is perhaps incongruous with and not the

logical extension of the Supreme Court's failure to apply Section
35-1-62, as amended, in Hinds.1

It is, however, consistent with

the legislative mandate as it applies to this plaintiff and this
defendant.

Any incongruity

is not created by the statutory

scheme but by the Hinds decision.

Such incongruity caused by a

judicial repeal of a portion of the 1975 amendments, however, is
^The quid pro quo concept has been suggested as a
reconciliation of this court's ruling today with the Hinds
decision. The concept has been relied upon and significant in
many Utah Supreme Court decisions addressing workers1
compensation.
The quid pro quo concept is this:
statutory
employers are granted immunity from suit because in being subject
to workers' compensation they assure qualifying workers of
moderate recovery.
Since contractors such as Western have no
liability under workers' compensation for workers such as
plaintiff, there is no quid pro quo. It is suggested, then, that
contractors such as Western situated downstream from the claimant
should not benefit from the exclusive remedy provision of the
workers' compensation statutes.
The court acknowledges this
suggestion as a possible reconciliation but does not adopt it as
a basis for its ruling.
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not a reason for this court to deem the amendments completely
repealed.2
As indicated in this court's ruling on the Paulsen motion,
employers may well have planned their affairs over the last ten
years in reliance on Hinds.

Nevertheless, in light of the dicta

in Shuoe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1976) and
uncertainly as to the reach of Hinds beyond the exact facts there
presented, it is not so clear that a business could reasonably
plan its affairs in reliance on workers' compensation being the
exclusive
contractual

remedy

when

hierarchy.

an

enterprise

is

downstream

Nevertheless, given

the

in

the

language of

Section 35-1-62, as amended, this court does not believe the
"upstream-downstream" argument of plaintiff is a legitimate basis
to distinguish Hinds.

Additionally, the court does not rely on

^Any such incongruity is quite obviously not unique to
Anglo-American jurisprudence and the judiciary's interpretation
of statutory schemes.
For example, in 1922 the United States
Supreme Court decided that professional baseball was not within
the scope of the federal antitrust laws. This was confirmed 31
years later because of the profession's longstanding reliance,
stare decisis, and deference to legislative correction. Toolson
v. New York Yankees, 34'6 U.S. 356 (1953) . As a practical master,
then, the ruling had evolved into a judicially created exemption.
Other professional sports such as Softball, football and boxing
have never been afforded the same exemption. The United States
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the differing treatment as
possibly "unrealistic, inconsistent or illogical." Nevertheless,
the Court has refused to overrule the exemption for baseball even
though conceding that the exemption for baseball would never have
been created in the 1950fs.
Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
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Shupe as authority for its denial of Western's Motion.

The court

does note, however, the hierarchical comparison of the instant
case to the facts in Hinds and Shupe.

The facts in Hinds are

comparable to the relation which plaintiff bears to Paulsen; the
facts in Shupe are comparable to the relation which plaintiff
bears to Western.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant Western's Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied, and plaintiff is granted its
requested Summary Judgment on Western's affirmative defense that
workers1 compensation is plaintiff's exclusive remedy.

The court

has taken an additional day beyond that promised to issue its
decision.

The additional time was necessary for the court to

both resolve the issue and give the parties at least a summary
articulation of the reasons for the ruling.
Dated this

24th

day of February, 1988.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH RIDDLE,

)

ALAN MAYS AND MOUNTAIN
STATES INSULATION
;I CORPORATION'S MEMORANDUM
1
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
]i
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALAN MAYS, and MOUNTAIN STATES
INSULATION CORP., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

]
1
)

Civil No. 86-268
Judge J. Phillip Eves

Defendants Alan Mays and Mountain States Insulation, by
and through their counsel of record, Nelson Hayes, RICHARDS,
BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, hereby respecrfully submit nhis
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of their Motion
to Dismiss.
INTRODUCTION
Alan Mays and Mountain States Insulation are filing a
Motion to Dismiss plaintiff Kenneth Riddle1s Complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Kenneth Riddle, an employee of Owens-Corning,
was sitting in his parked truck when he claims he was hit by a
truck driven by defendant Alan Mays, a Mountain States
Insulation (hereinafter "MSI") employee.

The accident:

occurred at the site of the Intermountain Power Project
(hereinafter "IPP") in Delta, Utah.
the time the accident occurred.

Both men were working at

As a result of the accident,

plaintiff claims that he injured his head and neck.
At the time of the accident, Owens-Corning was doing
construction for the IPP.

It had contracted out the

construction of a warehouse at the project to MSI.

Mr. Mays

was an employee of MSI, working on the IPP warehouse.
Owens-Corning authorized Mr. Riddle to supervise the warehouse
construction, and in particular, to oversee the safety aspects.
ARGUMENT
OWENS-CORNING IS THE STATUTORY EMPLOYER OF
ALAN MAYS AND MOUNTAIN STATES INSULATION.
Under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, workmen's
compensation is the exclusive remedy of an employee not. only
against the employer, but also against any employees of the same
employer.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1953 as amended).

The Act

defines "employee" broadly, to include not only traditionally
defined employees, but also contractors, subcontractors and
their respective employees:
Where an employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a
- 2 -

contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, this work is part
or process in the trade or business of the
employer, the contractor, all persons
employed by him, all subcontractors under
him, and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractors, are considered
employees of the original employer.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42(3)(b) (1953 as amended).

This broad

definition of the employer-employee relationship is known as the
"statutory employer" doctrine.
Thus, contractors and their employees may be "employees"
of the original employer for workmen's compensation purposes.
When an employer, such as Owens-Corning, hires a contractor,
such as MSI, both the contractor and all of the contractor's
employees may qualify as employees of the original employer.

In

order for a contractor and its employees to be "employees" of
the employer for workmen's compensation purposes, (1) the
employer must retain "some supervision or control over the
contractor's work," and (2) the work done by the contractor must
be "part or process in the trade or business of the employer."
Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 431
(Utah 1986).
The facts indicate that Owens-Corning retained control
and supervision over the work MSI was hired to do at the
IPP, and that building the warehouse, which Owens-Corning
hired MSI to do, was part or process of Owens-Coming's
business.

Therefore, MSI and Alan Mays are "employees" of

Owens-Corning for workmen's compensation purposes, and as such,
may not be sued by Kenneth Riddle, another Owens-Corning

- 3 -

employee.
A. Owens-Corning had the Right to Supervise and Control
MSX's Work.
The Utah Supreme Court in Pinter Construction Co, v.
Frisby analyzed the degree of control an employer must
exercise for purposes of §35-1-42.

Pinter Construction Co.

v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 308-9 (Utah 1984).

The issue in

Pinter was whether Clifford Frisby, hired by Pinter
Construction Co. to install metal siding on a maintenance
building, was an "employee" for workmen's compensation
purposes.

The Court held that he was, citing several factors as

evidence of control:
Pinter's control over Frisby was evidenced
on at least four occasions when Pinter
directed Frisby to get on with the work and
expressed concern about the deadlines for
finishing the job. Pinter's assertion of
some control over Frisby's activities
indicates that Pinter in fact had the right
to control and could have done so
frequently. It is not the actual
exercise of control that determines whether
an employer-employee relationship exists;
it is the right to control that is
determinative.
Pinter at 3 08-9.

The Court also found that (1) the employer

providing the material for the job, (2) inspections and
consultations by the employer's employees, and (3) the
employer's supervisor-overseeing the contractor's work, were
evidence of actual control by the employer.

Pinter at 3 08.

In the instant case, the evidence shows that
Owens-Corning had the right to control the MSI warehouse
project, and therefore MSI is an "employee" of Owens-Corning

- 4 -

for workmen's compensation purposes.

Owens-Corning's

employee, Kenneth Riddle, met with the MSI supervisor,
Maynard Crossland, on a daily basis. Mr. Riddle would also
be on the job, overseeing the progress of the warehouse, as
MSI and Mr. Mays were working.

Mr. Riddle's testimony clearly

establishes not only Owens-Coming's right to control and
direct MSI's work, but its actual control over the MSI
project:
Q

And you were in the job when he [Alan
Mays] was performing his activities?

A

Yes.

Q

You were there and you would oversee
what was happening?

A

Exactly.

Q

As Mountain States would perform their
work?

A

Right.

Q

And if it wasn't being done properly,
you had authority to require that it be
done properly?

A

Exactly.

Q

And you had authority to, as a result of
your involvement with Owens-Corning and
your knowledge of OSHA regulations and
so on and so forth, you had authority to
make sure that it was done safely?

A

Yes.

- 5 -

Q

And you could tell Mr. Crossland or
the people who worked under him how to
do the work if it wasn't being done
safely?

A

Yes.

Q

And if it was being done improperly, you
could require that they do it properly?

A

Yes.

Riddle Depo., pp. 21-22.
Therefore, the conduct of Owens-Corning and MSI
clearly shows that Owens-Corning had the right to control and in
fact actually controlled MSI's work such that their
relationship was that of employer-employee for purposes of
workmen's compensation.

Pursuant to §35-1-42, the statutory

employer doctrine, if MSI, as contractor, is an "employee" of
Owens-Corning for workmen's compensation purposes, it follows
that Mr. Mays is also an "employee" of Owens-Corning.
B. The Construction of the Warehouse by MSI is Part or
Process of Owens-Corning's Business.
The second prong of the workmen's compensation test for
the employer-employee relationship, "process in the trade or
business," was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Lee v.
Chevron Oil Co.:
All those operations which entered directly
into the successful performance of the
commercial function of the principal
employer . . . .
If the work is of such
character that it ordinarily or
appropriately would be performed by the
- 6 -

principal employer's own employees in the
prosecution of its business, or as a
central part in the maintenance thereof, it
is a part of [sic] process of his work.
Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d at 1131. The facts
establish that the work performed by MSI, the construction of
the warehouse, was in fact the kind of work usually performed by
Owens-Coming's own employees.

In fact, Owens-Corning began

to construct the warehouse itself.

After three weeks,

Owens-Coming decided to contract out the project to MSI. The
construction of the warehouse was an essential part of
Owens-Corningfs business, which was to build the IPP.
Mr. Mays himself was originally employed by
Owens-Corning to build the warehouse.

Then, when Owens-Corning

decided to contract out the warehouse construction, Mr. Mays
continued doing the same work he was doing for Owens-Corning but
was paid by MSI.

In both circumstances, he was supervised by

Mr. Riddle, an employee of Owens-Coming.
Therefore, the evidence shows that the construction of
the warehouse at the IPP was not only essential to
Owens-Coming's business, but was an activity originally
carried on by Owens-Corning's own employees.

Accordingly, the

construction of the warehouse by MSI was part or process of
Owens-Coming's business.
C. If Owens-Corning is a Statutory Employer of MSI,
MSI, Alan Mays and Kenneth Riddle are all Employees
of Owens-Corning.
Section 35-1-60 precludes employees who have received
workmen's compensation benefits not only from suing their
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employer, but also from suing other employees of the same
employer.

Since Owens-Corning is a statutory employer of MSI

and Alan Mays, pursuant to §3 5-1-42, Kenneth Riddle cannot bring
suit against MSI or Alan Mays after receiving workmen's
compensation benefits from Owens-Corning.

The Utah Supreme

Court has held Ma worker can be hired and paid by a
subcontractor but still be an employee of the general
contractor."

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1291

(Utah 1976).

If an employee has the same employer as another

employee, "he is entitled to and must accept workmen's
compensation and cannot maintain an action against either of
them [the employer or another employee of the same employer] for
negligence in causing his injuries." Bambrough at 1239.
See also Gallegos v. Stringham, 442 P.2d 31 (Utah
1968) (plaintiff and defendant held to be working for the same
employer, and therefore plaintiff cannot recover outside
workmen's compensation).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Owens-Corning satisfies the
requirements of the statutory employer doctrine.

Owens-Corning

had the right to supervise and control the work performed by
MSI.

In addition, the construction of the warehouse performed

by MSI was a part or process of Owens-Corning's business.
Accordingly, Owens-Corning is a statutory employer of both MSI
and Alan Mays, and therefore neither MSI nor Alan Mays May be

- 8 -

sued by another Owens-Corning employee, Kenneth Riddle.
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